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THE CENTRE FOR TAX SYSTEM INTEGRITY 
WORKING PAPERS 
 
 
The Centre for Tax System Integrity (CTSI) is a specialised research unit set up as a 
partnership between the Australian National University (ANU) and the Australian Taxation 
Office (Tax Office) to extend our understanding of how and why cooperation and 
contestation occur within the tax system.  
 
This series of working papers is designed to bring the research of the Centre for Tax 
System Integrity to as wide an audience as possible and to promote discussion among 
researchers, academics and practitioners both nationally and internationally on taxation 
compliance. 
 
The working papers are selected with three criteria in mind: (1) to share knowledge, 
experience and preliminary findings from research projects; (2) to provide an outlet for 
policy focused research and discussion papers; and (3) to give ready access to previews of 
papers destined for publication in academic journals, edited collections, or research 
monographs. 
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Abstract 
 
Between 1970 and 1972 the British colonial authorities in what was then the New Hebrides 
(now the Republic of Vanuatu) passed legislation that turned the territory into a tax haven, 
or Offshore Finance Centre (OFC). This paper examines the decision by the British to 
make Vanuatu an OFC. In the mid-1950s, interest rate differences between US and British 
banks, regulatory diversity between these two states and Soviet-US Cold War rivalry 
started to make third-party countries and territories increasingly attractive locations for the 
depositing and trading of US dollars and other currencies. As the post-World War II 
Bretton Woods agreement started to unravel in the 1960s and 1970s, banks, fund managers 
and wealthy individuals searched for new homes for surplus cash, free from central 
government control. In doing so, a number of countries and territories began to offer 
services to attract these funds. The rise of these Eurodollar foreign currency markets was 
crucial in the transition from fixed to floating exchange rates. Drawing from the growing 
scholarship of ‘the offshore’ along with primary sources held at the National Archives of 
Australia and those of Westpac Historical Services, it argues that the formation of the New 
Hebrides tax haven was the result of the interplay between English common law and the 
world’s Eurodollar money markets. The British colonial authorities were able to legislate 
for company, banking and fiduciary law to attract tax-free funds to Vanuatu. This paper 
explores the interplay between this legislation and emerging world money markets from an 
historical perspective. 
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English laws and global money markets: The rise of the Vanuatu tax haven 
 
Gregory Rawlings 
 
Introduction 
 
In 1999 the Federal Court of Australia, sitting in Queensland, was told of a family who had 
not filed a tax return for 20 years, but had A$13 million on term deposit with a Swiss bank 
managed by trustees in Vanuatu (see Map 1). The two applicants in this case,1 Doreen and 
Barry Beazley, had in the mid 1970s sold a successful business in New Zealand for an 
undisclosed sum and placed the proceeds in what was then the Anglo-French 
Condominium of the New Hebrides. They did not move to the New Hebrides with their 
funds, but instead relocated to Australia and settled in Queensland. Between 1989/90 – 
1995/96 these investments generated A$4 322 968, which was channelled through Vanuatu 
managed trusts, offshore corporations, captive insurance companies and debentures.  
 
On the basis of documents seized by the Australian National Crime Authority (NCA), it 
was alleged that Mr and Ms Beazley had each failed to declare income of A$1 080 742 
each between 1989 and 1996. However, the Beazley’s claimed that these funds were not 
income at all, but rather the progressive repayment and receipt of ‘loans’ to and from 
Vanuatu. To meet their day-to-day expenses the family used Bank of Hawaii credit cards 
with entities in Vanuatu paying off the resulting debts.2 They affirmed that these 
arrangements were part of ‘a sophisticated but lawful taxation structure’.3 Even though the 
court found that the documents suggested ‘a guilty mind’, it conceded that the structure 
might be ‘entirely legal’.4 
 
 
                                                           
1 Beazley v Steinhart. Federal Court of Australia (FCA) 447. The Honourable Dowsett J. Paragraphs 1-35. 14 
April 1999. Queensland District Registry, Federal Court of Australia. Reported in Australian Criminal 
Reports 106 (1999), 21-29; Beazley v Steinhardt. On Appeal from a Single Court Judge of the Federal Court 
of Australia. FCA 1255. The Honourable Spender, Drummond and Mansfield JJ. Paragraphs 1-47. 14 
September 1999. Queensland District Registry, Federal Court of Australia. Unreported Judgment: 
Butterworths BC9905270. 
2 See footnote 1. 
3 See footnote 1. 
4 See footnote 1. 
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In the same year, it was reported that A$107 billion of Russian mafia money had been 
processed through 400 offshore banks in Nauru.5 At the same time the government of Niue 
denied that its contractual relationship with the Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca had 
made the country an attractive finance centre for South American drug cartels.6 At the 
beginning of 2003 the Australian Taxation Office (Tax Office) revealed that A$295 million 
had been sent from Australia to Vanuatu where it was believed 60 tax avoidance schemes 
were operating.7 
 
Stories of money laundering and tax evasion through Pacific island tax havens have made 
prominent headlines in the media and alarming reading in official reports. From the late 
1990s Offshore Finance Centres (OFCs), more commonly known as ‘tax havens’ in the 
Pacific, Caribbean and Europe have been accused of facilitating money laundering, tax 
evasion, terrorist financing, accepting deposits from corrupt third world leaders and 
processing funds that should never have left their countries of origin (van Fossen, 2003). 
Supporters of OFCs counter this by contending that they perform a more vital role in the 
world’s financial markets. OFCs allow for asset protection in the event of marriage 
breakdown or forced heirship provisions, risk management, intellectual property holdings, 
outsourcing, superannuation, business acquisitions, raising loans, lending money and the 
holding of both domestic and international real estate. In this view these perfectly 
legitimate operations explain why some 67 countries and jurisdictions listed by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) offer some form of offshore finance facility, including 
London, Dublin and New York (Errico & Musalem, 1999). In 1998, a British 
Parliamentary report estimated that over US$6 trillion was kept offshore (Edwards, 1998). 
This is reportedly still growing (Hampton & Christensen, 2002). 
 
                                                           
5 ‘Island states Nauru, Niue face sanctions over drug, mafia money’, Canberra Times, 10 December 1999. 
6 ‘Niue denies drug-cartel links’, Canberra Times, 11 December 1999.  
7 ‘$5bn lost to foreign tax rorts’, The Australian, 6 January 2003; ‘Tax Office eyes dodgy Vanuatu tax 
schemes’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 15-16 February 2003. 
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Map 1: Vanuatu 
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However, what these two opposed views on offshore finance centres portrayed in the 
media and popular press share is a lack of historical perspective. Tax havens are presented 
as new, sudden, and aberrant intrusions into the world’s financial markets, portrayed as 
synonymous with the information age and the Internet. The only references to the past are 
broad caricatures that the wealthy have been using tax havens for ‘a long time’. For 
example in 6 January 2003 The Australian reported that ‘Billions of dollars are being 
transferred annually from Australia to tax havens … as mum-and-dad investors exploit 
new ‘get rich schemes’… the ATO has revealed it is not just the super rich taking 
advantage of the new phase of global tax dodging that has sprung up with the advent of the 
Internet and other online facilities’.8 Yet thirty years earlier in 1973, the Tax Office (then 
the Australian Tax Department) was observing similar trends with the Sun-Herald 
reporting ‘A special branch of the Tax Department has been detailed to examine the 
increased use of isolated tax havens such as the New Hebrides, the Dutch Antilles and the 
Cayman Islands’.9 It then went onto cite one tax officer who said ‘Once only the very rich 
would be bothered with tax avoidance schemes, but that’s no longer the situation. Today’s 
increasing rate of inflation has made it increasingly a middle-class thing’. What the 
Internet is in one era, was inflation in another. These sensationalist reports tend to obscure 
the complex origins of offshore finance and tax havens, though both hint at the dramatic 
changes that have allowed countries such as Vanuatu to host OFC facilities; 
transformations in law, economy and polity. 
 
The burgeoning scholarship on ‘tax havens’ however, is rich with historical detail and 
analysis of the economic and geo-political transformations that created ‘the offshore’ as a 
distinct realm of financial activity. This paper draws both from this scholarship and 
archival records to contextualise the emergence of the Vanuatu or New Hebrides OFC in 
the early 1970s. In doing so it illustrates how the Vanuatu tax haven emerged as a result of 
the interplay between law and liquidity. Contradictions in the post-World War II regulatory 
and financial landscape facilitated the trading of tax-free foreign currency deposits, 
securities and bonds. These circumvented onshore controls by using tax havens such as 
Vanuatu as ‘booking centres’ (Hampton, 1996, pp. 21-25). The colonial authorities 
                                                           
8 The Australian, 6 January 2003. 
9 ‘Growing Search for Havens Worries the Revenue Men’, The Sun-Herald, 16 September 1973.  
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provided the legal infrastructure to do this by implementing laws that enabled banks, 
trustee companies and financial traders to operate out of the Vila OFC, allowing waves of 
liquidity unleashed by the ascendant money markets of the 1960s to surge upon its coral 
sea shores.  
 
From an exporter of labour and then copra in the 19th and 20th centuries, the later part of 
the century saw Vila become a small but niche participant in the London money markets. 
This was actively encouraged by the British colonial authorities, but caused alarm in 
Australia, the latter with its much weaker link to international finance capital. In 
concentrating on the tax implications of the Vanuatu OFC, Australia failed to understand 
that it also served an equally important role – it was part of a geo-political package of tax 
havens located around the world that assisted in maintaining the city of London as the 
world’s pre-eminent financial trading centre. While Australian authorities were 
increasingly alarmed at the rise of regional tax havens, its bankers, lawyers, accountants 
and fund managers who relocated in Vila relished these developments. Not only did they 
engineer Vila’s participation in the London money markets and structure financial products 
for the likes of the Beazley’s, but also their arrival triggered an economic explosion in the 
New Hebrides. Between 1972 and 1974 Vila’s population tripled, land prices boomed, new 
buildings were built at rapid speed and lines of credit were extended into the pastoral 
economy.  
 
Judith Bennett (2000, p. 5), reflecting on the value of archives in the Pacific, has written 
that many metropolitan and island governments have allowed ‘their tertiary history 
departments to run down.’ She continues that ‘They failed to consolidate on the growing 
Pacific scholarship of the 1970s and early 1980s, so that recent events, deeply embedded in 
a complex historical context came as a surprise to many’. This paper, drawing from 
primary source records at the National Archives of Australia and the Westpac Banking 
Corporation, provides an historical overview of the emergence of offshore finance in the 
Pacific, by focusing on the rise of the New Hebrides/Vanuatu tax haven in the early 1970s. 
In doing so it may provide an historical context for contemporary tales of money 
laundering and tax evasion, asset protection and corporate financing.  
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Legal states, lawful colonies 
 
A tax haven is a jurisdiction that levies no, or very low, direct corporate and personal 
income taxes (Walters, 1983). They are also known as Offshore Finance Centres (OFCs) 
and both terms are used in this paper. Mark Hampton (1996, p. 4) defines an OFC as a 
jurisdiction ‘that hosts financial activities that are separated from major regulating units 
(states) by geography and/or by legislation’. Countries and territories that host OFC 
facilities offer a legal system that provides for the formation of international companies, 
trusts and foundations, also known as Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) that can be used in 
the management of tax neutral portfolios and world-wide assets. Most OFCs are based on 
English common law. The few that are based on continental civil law codes, such as 
Monaco and Andorra are limited in the choice of financial services that they offer. Civil 
law systems of law tend not to recognise trusts and fiduciaries and do not provide for 
courts of equity that can rule on property. Hence OFCs with civil law systems tend to limit 
their services to confidential private banking, company management and specialist services 
such as cross-border taxation planning.10 
 
Throughout the years of joint French and British rule in the New Hebrides, from 1906-
1980, two radically divergent systems of law operated in the same place at the same time; 
English common law and French civil law. The former is based on judicial precedent and 
the rulings of judges, with its origins in the innovations of the Plantagenet Kings of 
medieval England. French civil law however, is based on the Napoleonic code, whereby 
judges must make their decisions according to broad principals, rather than past precedent 
and the flexible interpretation of often conflicting rules. While civil and common law 
systems may co-exist together, they are invariably partitioned by spatially defined notions 
of jurisdiction. For example Scottish law (much closer to civil law than the common law) 
operates only in Scotland, not the whole of the United Kingdom and civil law codes in the 
United States and Canada are confined to Louisiana and Quebec respectively. Never 
before, had two such different systems of state-sanctioned law existed in the same place at 
the same time, as in the New Hebrides. The third law - condominium - was a combination 
of both systems and accommodated indigenous customary (kastom) law, though rulings of 
                                                           
10 Author interview with accountants, Andorra La Vella, Principality of Andorra, 04 December 2003.  
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the Joint Court tended to invoke the 1914 Protocol rather than past precedents, thus 
remaining more faithful to the civil law system of its French co-ruler.  
 
These distinctions, and particularly the presence of English common law within the 
territory were crucial to the formation of the New Hebrides tax haven in 1970-1971. 
Article 5:2 of the 1914 Protocol, which had superseded the convention of 1906 that had 
established the condominium, gave the two French and British administrations the power 
to levy direct taxation by joint regulation.11 While poll taxes were levied on indigenous 
communities, neither the joint (condominium) nor national (French and British) 
administrations chose to levy taxes on their own citizens resident in the territory.12 Thus 
the New Hebrides remained free of income tax for British and French residents alike from 
the very beginning of the condominium.  
 
France did not levy direct taxation in its other Pacific territories of New Caledonia, Wallis 
& Futuna and French Polynesia either, but the power to decide this rested firmly with 
Paris. The United Kingdom on the other hand, with its view that its colonies were foreign 
countries under the crown’s jurisdiction, invested the power to tax in local legislatures and 
administrations. In the absence of a local legislature (the New Hebrides Advisory Council 
was a condominium institution rather than an exclusively French or British body) a large 
measure of fiscal autonomy was conferred in the local colonial administration; the 
Residency and its public service, the New Hebrides British Service (NHBS). The Colonial, 
and later Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) seldom interfered in local taxation 
matters, but rather permitted local colonial authorities to set their own fiscal policies. All 
British colonies were able to devise and enforce their own taxation systems while utilising 
the framework provided by English common law and equity to establish trusts, companies 
and a range of offshore financial products. This has enabled territories such as the Cayman 
Islands, Bermuda, Hong Kong, Gibraltar and the New Hebrides to establish OFCs from the 
1950s through to the 1970s.  
 
                                                           
11 Protocol Respecting the New Hebrides signed at London on August 6, 1914, by Representatives of the 
British and French Governments [Ratification's exchanged at London, March 18, 1922]. 
12 Professor Margaret Jolly, comments to author apropos the imposition of poll or head taxes in South 
Pentecost, New Hebrides.  
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The income tax-free status of New Caledonia and French Polynesia could be revoked at 
any time. Because French civil law regime does not recognise trusts and limits major 
modifications of company law, these territories could not be used as international tax 
havens and OFCs for non-residents. In 1946 and 1958 France reorganised its overseas 
empire, establishing departments d’outre-mer (Overseas Departments, DOMs) and 
territories d’outre mer (Overseas Territories, TOMs), integrating these DOM-TOMs into 
the French metropole. Robert Aldrich and John Connell state that ‘… DOM-TOMs do not 
enjoy sovereignty over domestic or internal affairs. The metropole coordinates policy 
through a department for DOM-TOM affairs that has existed since the disbanding of the 
old colonial ministry’ (Aldrich & Connell, 1998, p. 29). The civil law system and the fact 
that French policy prevented local administrations from making substantial modifications 
to metropolitan law (despite the slightly greater autonomy exercised by the Pacific island 
TOMs as opposed to France’s Caribbean DOMs) had fiscal implications. While French 
Polynesia and New Caledonia may not have levied tax on local residents, this status did not 
automatically mean that they could be used as offshore tax havens for non-residents.  
 
The condominium system in the New Hebrides produced a series of constitutional 
compromises, bifurcating power between the two administrations, with France 
encouraging integration with the metropole (through territorialisation and eventual 
departmentalisation), while the UK sought to give the New Hebrides comprehensive 
autonomy with the ultimate goal of independence. The British prerogative of granting 
widespread fiscal powers to local administrations, including to tax or not to tax, remained 
intact. Between the end of World War II and 1970 British citizens and residents subject to 
British jurisdiction (optants) in the New Hebrides relied on the British Companies Act of 
1929 and 1948 to register firms and regulate business activities.13 There was concern about 
the legality of these acts to register companies in the New Hebrides as the 1948 Act in 
particular did not give the British Resident Commissioner sufficient power to fully regulate 
business activity in Vila. The lack of banking legislation allowed individuals to incorporate 
banks under the 1948 Companies Act, even though it was not designed for that purpose. 
Moreover, there were cases of citizens of third countries who had opted for the French 
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legal system but then incorporated British companies, ‘many of them for land speculation 
purposes’.14 In 1967 the opening of the first British legal firm in the New Hebrides in led 
to the ‘rapid growth in the number of incorporated companies’.15  
 
Taking ‘into account the fiscal situation in the New Hebrides’ the Australia and New 
Zealand Banking Group (ANZ) opened a branch in Vila on 23 March 1970.16 Yet the laws 
in place were inadequate to deal with increasing financial and commercial activity. In 
response the British administration sent representatives to London in April 1970 for 
discussions with the FCO, the Bank of England, the Board of Trade and the Treasury. The 
British Secretary for Financial Affairs in the New Hebrides, Mr Mitchell, then visited 
Bermuda and the Cayman Islands. The Cayman Islands had enacted offshore company and 
trustee legislation in 1966, and by 1971 had in excess of 2500 companies, 600 trusts and 
five major multinational banks (Caufield, 1978). Not only was the offshore sector expected 
to reach US$20 billion globally by the end of the 1970s, but there was already US$60 
billion circulating in the international money markets that flowed without hindrance 
between deregulated (though not unregulated) OFCs such as the Bermuda, the Bahamas 
and Hong Kong (Caufield, 1978; Castlemen, 1971). Within this context a report to the 
Australian Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet in 1972 stated: 
 
As a result of these wide-ranging talks and discussions, the British Administration 
took a policy decision that since the private sector was determined to use Vila as an 
international investment centre, there was no alternative but to enact legislation to 
control the situation and seek to gain much-needed revenue to keep down the 
spiralling grant-in-aid.17 
 
Thus in 1970 and 1971 the British Administration introduced the Banks and Banking 
Regulations [CAP 8] 1970, Companies Regulations [CAP 9] 1970 and Trust Companies 
                                                                                                                                                                                
13 ‘The Investment Industry in the New Hebrides’, a report for the Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet, Canberra, Reference No. 70/6973, 25 August 1972, National Archives of Australia (hereinafter 
NAA): A 1838/366, A 840/13/3, Part 1 New Hebrides as a Tax Haven, 4. 
14 See footnote 13. 
15 See footnote 13. 
16 See footnote 13. 
17 ‘The Investment Industry in the New Hebrides’, NAA, Canberra: A 1838/366, A 840/13/3, Part 1 New 
Hebrides as a Tax Haven, 5. 
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Regulations [CAP 10] 1971.18 International Banks, trust firms, investment houses and 
companies quickly established themselves in Vila. By 1972, 500 companies, mostly 
Australian, had been set up in the archipelago’s capital.19 The Australian reported that 
‘Hundreds of companies formed by individuals – authors, architects and entertainers – are 
switching to Vila from the Bahamas and Switzerland’.20 To service these new companies, 
accountants, legal firms and banks followed suit. By 1972 the accountants Price 
Waterhouse, Cooper Brothers and Arthur Anderson had all opened offices. Whereas there 
had only been one bank in 1969 (Banque de’l Indochine), by the end of 1973 13 overseas 
banks had opened their doors, including all major Australian banks (see Table 1).  
 
Not all of this investment came from Australia. This is reflected in shareholdings of trust 
companies. By the end of 1973, 10 trust companies had been established in Vila.21 Trust 
companies are crucial in the offshore sector, providing fiduciary financial services to 
corporate clients and wealthy individuals. Australian banks were instrumental in 
establishing trust companies in Port Vila. However, they also had substantial shareholdings 
from financial institutions and banks from the United States, the United Kingdom, Hong 
Kong and Japan (see Table 2). Caribbean financial institutions were also shareholders in 
some of the larger trusts. For example the Melitco (Melanesia International Trust Company 
Limited) consortium included the Bank of Bermuda and Bahamas International Trust 
Company Limited.  
 
 
 
 
                                                           
18 ‘Title III. Chapter 8 [Cap. 8] Banks and Banking’, B C Ballard (editor), The British Laws of the New 
Hebrides containing the revised text of the Queen's Regulations and Subsidiary Legislation made there under 
in force on 22 September 1971, (Port Vila 17 September, 1970); ‘Title IV. Chapter 9 [Cap. 9] Companies. To 
provide for the Incorporation, Regulation and Winding up of Companies New Hebrides’, The British Laws of 
the New Hebrides, 2 (Port Vila 22 September 1970); ‘Title IV. Companies Chapter 9 [Cap. 9] Companies 
Rules’, The British Laws of the New Hebrides, 3 (Port Vila 15 April 1971); ‘Title IV. Chapter 10 [Cap. 10] 
Trust Companies. To provide for the Licensing and the Regulation of the Business of Trust Companies The 
British Laws of the New Hebrides’, The British Laws of the New Hebrides, 2 (Port Vila 13 May 1972).  
19 ‘Australians Join Rush to Tax Haven: 500 firms set up offices in New Hebrides’, The Australian, 28 
August 1972, NAA A1838/366, 840/13/3, Part 1 New Hebrides as a Tax Haven.  
20 See footnote 19. 
21 ‘Bank and Trust Company Representation in the New Hebrides’, (Sydney, Westpac Historical Services, 
hereinafter WHS), 6 September and 31 December 1973, 2003/40/72. 
 11
Table 1: Banks licensed in the New Hebrides - 31 December 1973 22 
ANZ (Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd) 
Australia & New Zealand Savings Bank Ltd 
Commercial Banking Company of Sydney Ltd 
The CBC Savings Bank Ltd 
Bank of New South Wales Ltd 
Bank of New South Wales Savings Bank Ltd 
National Bank of Australia 
The National Banking Savings Bank Ltd 
Barclays Bank International  
Commonwealth Savings Bank of Australia Ltd 
Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) 
Melanesia International Trust Company Ltd 
Burns Philp & International Trustee Company Ltd  
Asian & Pacific Commercial Bank Ltd 
Bank Gutzwiller Kurz Bungener (Overseas) Ltd  
 
Table 2: New Hebridean Trust Companies with Shareholdings - 6 September 1973 23 
 
Trust Company Share 
% 
Trust Company Share 
% 
PITCO (Pacific International Trust 
Company) 
 Burns Philp & International 
Trustee Company Lyd 
 
 Bank of New South Wales 20  Consolidated Holdings (owned 
by Burns Philp & Co Ltd) 
25.61 
 Bank of America N.T. & S.A. 
(through its wholly owned subsidiary 
Bamercial International Finance 
Corporation) 
20  The Royal Trust Co 25.61 
 The Sunitomo Bank Ltd 20  National Nominees Ltd (owned 
by the National Bank of 
Australia) 
13.72 
 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd 12.5  Banque de l’ Indochine 10.00 
 Montreal Trust Company 12.5  Lloyds & Bolsa International 
Bank Ltd 
5.49 
 
                                                           
22 ‘Bank and Trust Company Representation in the New Hebrides’, (Sydney, WHS), 6 September 1973 
2003/40/72. 
23 See footnote 22. 
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Table 2(ctd): New Hebridean Trust Companies with Shareholdings - 6 September 1973 
 
Trust Company Share 
% 
Trust Company Share 
% 
PITCO (Pacific International Trust 
Company), cont., 
 Burns Philp & International 
Trustee Company Lyd, cont., 
 
 Darling & Company Ltd 7.5  The Bank of Tokyo Ltd 5.49 
 Hill Samuel & Co Ltd 7.5  The Mitsui Bank  4.57 
    The Chartered Bank Hong Kong 
Trustee Ltd 
3.11 
    Lancaster Investments Ltd 1.83 
      
MELTICO (Melanesia International 
Trust Company) 
 Investors Trust Limited  
 ANZ 32.5  Dudley Nevison Schoales 
(partner Morgan Stanley & Co, 
New York) 
72.77 
 Australian International Finance 
Corporation Ltd 
14.375  Nils A. Lundberg of New York  6.55 
 Bahamas International Trust 
Company Ltd 
14.375  Lord Cato 6.55 
 Barclays Bank International Ltd 14.375  Clayton B Wentworth  6.41 
 The Hong Kong & Shanghai 
Banking Corporation  
14.375  Maryann B Wentworth  6.41 
 The Bank of Bermuda  10.00  R B Garry of New York  1.31 
Trust Company Share 
% 
Trust Company Share 
% 
New Hebrides Trust Limited  Commercial Pacific Trust 
Company Limited 
 
 The Commercial Banking 
Corporation  
18.75  The Commercial Bank of 
Australia Ltd 
25 
 Development Finance Corporation  9.375  Europacific Finance Corporation 
24  
15 
 Winchcombe Carson Trustee 
Company Ltd  
9.375  Trustees Executor & Agency 
Company Ltd  
10 
 Westminster Nominees Limited  25.00  The Fuji Bank Ltd  12.5 
 Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce 
12.5  The Toronto Dominion Bank  12.5 
 Dai-Icho Kanyo Bank Ltd 12.5  United California Bank 12.5 
 The Sanwa Bank Ltd 12.5  European Asian Bank  12.5 
    
Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, Hong 
Kong (Trustee) Ltd 
 Hartley Pacific Corporation, New 
Hebrides  
 
 Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank 
Limited  
100  Private Shareholdings  100 
    
Abacus (New Hebrides) Ltd  SATO Ltd   
 Owned by Coopers & Lybrand. No 
further shareholding details available. 
  No further shareholding details 
available.  
 
 
                                                           
24 The shareholders in the Europacific Finance Corporation were the Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd, 
25%; Midland Bank Ltd, 15.5%; Fuji Bank Ltd, 15.5%; United California Bank International, 12%; 
Amsterdam-Rotterdam Bank NV, 8%; Deutsche Bank AG, 8%; Societe Generale de Banque SA Brussels, 
8% and Societe General Paris, 8%.  
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Caribbean connections 
 
Perceptions and conditions of political stability vary through time, and in the 1970s it was 
not the Pacific that was deemed unstable but the Caribbean, whose territories had been 
founded as some of the world’s first tax havens. Wealthy Americans for example, had used 
the Bahamas as a tax haven since the 1930s (Hampton, 1996; Picciotto, 1999). In the 1970s 
however, the Caribbean, and especially the Bahamas and Bermuda were considered 
increasingly unstable. The latter had implemented foreign exchange controls and was 
considering introducing direct taxes. Imminent Bahamian independence was discouraging 
offshore investors and making them look elsewhere (Hughes, 1981). In 1972, the 
Australian Representative Designate in Nauru, L. G. Stellers, visited the New Hebrides.25 
While in Vila Stellers discussed offshore business developments with two executives from 
the accountancy firm, Peat Marwick, Mitchell & Co. They informed Stellers ‘much of the 
business came from the Bahamas and Bermuda and to a lesser extent from the UK and US 
firms.’26 He also met with a senior inspector with the ANZ, a Mr Scrambler, who was also 
visiting the New Hebrides at the time, for the opening of the MELTICO trust company. 
The ANZ’s inspector informed Stellers that:  
 
A considerable number of financial companies, which had hitherto operated in the 
Bahamas, were now losing confidence in the political stability of the Bahamas 
which had achieved self-government and was being run by mainly indigenous 
politicians. Scrambler said that the political climate in the New Hebrides was much 
better for financial transactions. The French Administration was conservative and 
self-government was nowhere in sight. In these circumstances the investment 
industry in the New Hebrides was growing rapidly, while the Bahamas was losing 
its attraction as a financial haven. Scrabler said that most of the money coming into 
the New Hebrides now was ‘Bahamian money’.27 
 
 
                                                           
25 ‘Australian Representative (Designate), L. G. Stellers, Nauru – The Secretary, Department of Foreign 
Affairs, Canberra’, Memo No. 1177, 9 November 1972, (Canberra, NAA) A 1838/366, A 840/13/3, Part 1 
New Hebrides as a Tax Haven. 
26 See footnote 25. 
27 See footnote 25. 
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Port Vila: Financescapes in the Coral Sea  
 
The arrival of trust companies, banks, accountancy firms and expatriates resulted in an 
economic boom in and around Vila. Land prices in the capital soared in value. In parts of 
the Central Business District they increased from 10 cents per square foot to A$15 dollars 
per square foot between 1970 and 1971.28 While much of the activity was offshore in 
focus, the new service industries of international finance required new buildings, housing, 
infrastructure improvements and reliable telecommunications. This provided a range of 
ancillary employment opportunities for a growing expatriate population and ni-Vanuatu in 
the construction, retail and service sectors. The presence of so many banks to choose from 
also helped finance this growth, providing much needed credit to the condominium. In 
1974 the Joint Administration borrowed A$2 million from two of these banks to fund 
major infrastructural projects. These included upgrading telephone facilities in Vila and 
Santo, expanding the Vila wharf, civil service housing and compensation payouts to 
indigenous landowners for road construction. The condominium raised more capital for 
additional projects such as improving the ‘Vila and Santo water supplies, low cost housing 
and staff housing’. 29 
 
The multiplier effect – the effects of new investments that result in the payment of wages, 
salaries, fees, to a chain of workers, suppliers, retailers and households – through the New 
Hebridean economy, particularly in Vila and its peri-urban environs, fuelled economic 
growth in the 1970s and led to a construction boom and a growth in employment 
opportunities. The presence of trust companies, banks and accountancy firms created 
financial relationships not only between these firms, but also with contractors, suppliers, 
workers, architects, building firms, telecommunication providers, market gardeners, local 
transport and distribution networks and the government. Thus the multiplier effect of the 
New Hebrides tax haven reverberated through the South Efate regional economy linking 
everyone from indigenous housekeepers through to expatriate financiers in a matrix of 
expanding urban economic growth. In his discussion of the rise of OFCs in terms of 
regulatory dualism, Sol Picciotto (1999, p. 59) notes that the arrival of financial services 
                                                           
28 ‘Tax Haven in the New Hebrides’, The Fiji Times, 14 May 1971, (Canberra, NAA) A1838/366, 840/13/3, 
Part 1 New Hebrides as a Tax Haven. 
29 ‘Business Briefs’, Pacific Islands Monthly (hereinafter PIM), May 1974, 121.  
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can have a significant impact on small island economies. He writes that ‘the employment 
effects and economic impact from an offshore centre are proportionately much greater in 
the small island centres, especially those which have pushed on to become ‘functional’ 
centres, offering a range of services such as trusts and fund management, stockbroking, 
reinsurance, and even stock exchanges.’ Mark Hampton (1996) suggests that even the 
intra-firm links between trust companies, banks, fund managers, law firm and clearing 
banks, in terms of fees paid and services provided (such as auditing) tend to permeate 
through a small economy. 
 
British banking, trustee and company legislation therefore had a significant impact on 
economic and urban growth in Port Vila. Moreover, the provision of credit to the joint 
administration led to the improvement of infrastructure, particularly air and sea transport 
links. This in turn brought an increased number of tourists to the islands and encouraged 
hotel corporations to build small resorts, whose guests could dine in the new waterfront 
restaurants opened by expatriate investors who in turn employed ni-Vanuatu waiters, 
waitresses, cooks, chefs and cleaners. The extension of Vila’s wharf, made possible by 
bank credit to the local administration, meant that thousands of day visitors started 
disembarking from the P&O Fairstar and other cruise-liners once a week. The improved 
wharf and stevedoring facilities also allowed planters and growers to increase their exports 
of beef and copra, with higher profits invested in abattoirs and new stock. It also changed 
the value of land – it could be cleared to increase agricultural productivity and it could be 
sold at vastly inflated prices. This reawakened ni-Vanuatu opposition to the alienation of 
their land holdings and rapidly became the main driving force behind calls for 
independence. Thus the multiplier effect of the tax haven extended into pastoral economy 
and eventually into the political domain. It was felt that the phenomenal growth in the early 
to mid 1970s was just the beginning of a much larger and more dynamic finance centre. 
One bank official wrote an investor in late 1971 ‘… our investigations lead us to believe 
that the New Hebrides will develop into the major tax haven in the Pacific’.30 Within three 
years this banking executive’s prediction seemed to be on the verge of materialising, with 
Robert Forster writing: 
 
                                                           
30 Correspondence, Sydney-Montreal, (Sydney, WHS), 12 December 1971, 2003/40/68. 
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… the British Government introduced legislation modelled on the Cayman Island 
pattern to control the registration of companies and tax haven activities. So Wall 
Street, the City, Melbourne and Sydney were officially informed that the New 
Hebrides had become a tax haven. The result was electrifying. Between 1972 and 
1974 Vila became a boom town. Thirteen overseas banks opened their doors; the 
expatriate population tripled, subdivisions sprouted in what had been previously 
virgin bush; and, as a side effect, tourism took off. Two large new hotels were built 
to international standards, air services increased rapidly and cruise ships tied at 
regular intervals alongside a newly built wharf capable of berthing vessels up to 
40 000 tons. Suddenly Vila was on the map (Forster, 1980, p. 371). 
 
The OFC transformed Vila and permeated into the rest of the territory. Officially the 
British supported that formation of the tax haven as a means of achieving economic 
growth, stability and financial independence. The administration argued that it would allow 
London to reduce its annual grant of aid to the territory. In a speech to 120 guests attending 
the opening of Melitco’s new corporate headquarters in downtown Port Vila in November 
1972, the British Resident Commissioner, Sir Collin Allan paid ‘tribute’ to the part played 
by the finance industry in contributing to the ‘development’ of the New Hebrides.31 The 
Acting British High Commissioner to Australia was just as clear when he wrote the 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet in Canberra, that one of the main aims of 
the British was:  
 
… to obtain maximum assistance from these activities to accelerate the economic 
development of the New Hebrides group … It has not been possible to agree with 
our French colleagues on the introduction of any direct taxation in the 
Condominium. We have therefore turned our attention to maximising the benefits 
which may accrue to the group from its tax-free status, whilst at the same time 
minimising any possible losses of revenue through tax evasion.32 
 
 
                                                           
31 Speech, ‘Investment Industry Must Key Itself to New Hebrides Needs’ by Sir Colin Allan, British Resident 
Commissioner in the New Hebrides, British Newsletter, Issued by the British Residency Information Office, 
Vila, 14 November 1972, (Canberra, NAA) A1838/366, 840/13/3, Part 1 New Hebrides as a Tax Haven. 
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Australian opposition, British encouragement 
 
In the narrative of the New Hebrides condominium and its demise, France and the UK are 
presented as the two key protagonists, the latter supported by its post-colonial protégées, 
Australia and New Zealand. This binary begins to dissolve in finer details, particularly 
taxation. As noted earlier, the tax-free status of French Pacific TOMs did not mean that 
they could be used as offshore platforms for tax minimisation in France or anywhere else 
for that matter. France had always opposed tax havens – paradis fiscal – and had actively 
attempted to prevent French citizens from using them. In 1963 it had forced Monaco to 
curtail tax haven activity by terminating the tax-free privileges that French citizens enjoyed 
in the principality (though they remained for nationals of other countries who wished to 
use Monaco to abate their taxes). The British however, permitted and seemingly 
encouraged the formation of tax havens in most of their smaller territories including the 
New Hebrides. Yet the para-constitutional provisions of the condominium prevented 
France from openly opposing the formation of the tax haven in the New Hebrides, despite 
its concerns about them elsewhere. Instead it was left to Australia to challenge British 
policy in this area.  
 
Australian officials could not understand why the British were so enthusiastic about 
encouraging the New Hebrides tax haven. Australia was opposed to the formation of OFCs 
as a large number of Australian individuals and companies were using them to avoid their 
tax obligations. The Australian government had passed legislation to close down the 
Norfolk Island tax haven in 1972, a decision upheld in Berwick Ltd v Gray (1976).33 
However, the Australian government had no jurisdiction in the New Hebrides and had to 
rely on negotiating with the British to review the tax havens operations. At the time 
Australia, in common with most other industrialised countries, had no Controlled Foreign 
Company (CFC) legislation. A taxpayer could avoid their domestic tax obligations by 
forming an intermediary company in a low or no tax jurisdiction to receive that income 
rather than remitting it to their home country (OECD, 1996; Burns, 1992). If funds were 
                                                                                                                                                                                
32 D. P. Aiers, Acting British High Commissioner, Canberra – Sir John Bunting CBE, Department of the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet, Canberra, Correspondence, 15 August 1972, emphasis added, Canberra, NAA) 
A1838/366, 840/13/3, Part 1 New Hebrides as a Tax Haven. 
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required then they could be returned to the ‘investor’ by way of ‘loans’ and capital 
payments through trusts and holding companies. The structuring of financial arrangements 
in this way could be used to deny a personal connection with the arrangement. The UK did 
not have any CFC legislation at the time either, but it did not share Australian opposition to 
tax havens.  
 
The British had two official explanations for this. As discussed above, the first was that 
OFCs contributed to development in small and remote territories. The second was that 
there was a distinction between perfectly legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion in 
British law, a separation confirmed by the House of Lords in 1949 (Picciotto, 1999). This 
distinction was emphasised by the British administration in the New Hebrides. In his visit 
to Vila in 1972, The Australian Representative Designate to Nauru, Stellers, also met with 
the Secretary for Finance in the British Administration, Mr F Brown. In his memo to 
Canberra, Stellers reported that ‘Brown made the point that the British Government 
traditionally accepted that individuals and companies were at liberty to arrange their 
business in such a way as to minimise the incidence of tax on their incomes. Such tax 
avoidance was regarded by the British as legitimate and he cited use made by British 
companies of the arrangements available in the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, where 
apparently no income tax was levied. Brown made a distinction between legitimate tax 
avoidance and tax evasion, which was regarded as illegal by the Treasury authorities’.34 
 
Australia made little distinction between evasion and avoidance. Australian tax and 
treasury officials told a visiting British parliamentary delegation in Canberra in October 
1972 that ‘Australia was concerned both with illegal tax evasion and the avoidance of 
taxation within the law. Treasury felt that legislation to cover tax avoidance by the use of 
Norfolk Island as a tax haven might be frustrated if the New Hebrides could be used for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
33 Anthony van Fossen, (2002); Berwick Ltd v Gray, High Court of Australia 133. The Honourable Barwick 
CJ.; McTierban, Mason, Jacobs and Murphy JJ. High Court of Australia. Reported in Commonwealth Law 
Reports, 603 (1976). 
34 ‘Australian Representative (Designate), L. G. Stellers, Nauru – The Secretary, Department of Foreign 
Affairs, Canberra’, Memo No. 1177, 9 November 1972, (Canberra, NAA) A 1838/366, A 840/13/3, Part 1 
New Hebrides as a Tax Haven. 
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same purposes’.35 The British were not convinced by this and the FCO insisted on having a 
‘fairly concise statement of the disadvantages that Australia sees in the operation of the 
New Hebrides as a tax haven’, before acting on Canberra’s concerns.36 The Australian 
Treasury however, was unwilling to cooperate. It informed the Department of Foreign 
Affairs that ‘We should be reluctant, as things now stand, to add to the British expertise in 
these matters by divulging the particular ways in which it is known that Australian 
residents are seeking to use the New Hebrides to minimise their tax.’37 While the British 
authorities, both in London and in Vila, were willing to discuss the tax haven with 
Australian officials, they were not about to close it down, as Australia had with Norfolk 
Island. In an earlier response to the British High Commissioner’s official position on the 
tax haven, a foreign affairs memorandum reported that [Australian] Treasury ‘said it was 
clear we weren’t going to get far with the British. It was tax avoidance (the avoidance, 
within the law, of taxation) rather than illegal tax evasion that we were concerned about. 
He [Treasury Official] described the British reply as ‘full of lies and courteous 
statements’.38 Yet while Treasury thought that it might be appropriate to hold talks with the 
British in Vila itself, as a means of deterring Australians from using the tax haven, the 
offshore industry and its clientele seemed unconcerned. The British authorities no doubt 
aided this. While the UK insisted that Australia keep their negotiations secret from France, 
it had no hesitation in covertly passing on information gained from talks with their 
Australian counterparts to the banks, trust companies and fund managers that had 
established themselves in Vila. At the conclusion of the Anglo-Australian talks in mid 
1973, one banker in Vila reported: 
 
 
 
                                                           
35 ‘Record of Interdepartmental Meeting with Mr Anthony Kershaw, M.C., M.P., Held at Department of 
Foreign Affairs, 10.15am, Wednesday 11 October 1972, (Canberra, NAA) A 1838/366, A 840/13/3, Part 1 
New Hebrides as a Tax Haven. 
36 Memorandum, ‘First Secretary, Australian High Commission – The Secretary, Department of Foreign 
Affairs, Canberra, Ref No 3/6/1/5, Memo. No. 1187, 10 November 1972, (Canberra, NAA) A 1838/366, A 
840/13/3, Part 1 New Hebrides as a Tax Haven. 
37 Correspondence, ‘First Assistant Secretary, The Treasury, Canberra – The Secretary, Department of 
Foreign Affairs, Canberra, Ref No 67/5391, 30 November 1972, (Canberra, NAA) A 1838/366, A 840/13/3, 
Part 1 New Hebrides as a Tax Haven. 
38 Memorandum, File No 735/3/1, 30 August 1972, (Canberra, NAA) A 1838/366, A 840/13/3, Part 1 New 
Hebrides as a Tax Haven. 
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… the British have leaked information that representations have been made by 
Australia to London to further the former’s hopes of gaining access to information 
on local activities in this Tax Haven, and that these approaches were rebuffed … the 
British are now clearly committed to assisting the Tax Haven expansion.39 
 
The British enthusiasm for assisting the expansion of the tax haven, to the extent of leaking 
diplomatically sensitive information, suggests that they had additional interests in its 
success over and above its contribution to local development, reducing grants-in-aid and 
assisting individuals to ‘legitimately’ minimise their taxes. The Australian Treasury could 
not understand how savings derived from lower aid commitments could exceed the total 
amount of money lost to the British Inland Revenue through the use of tax havens such as 
the New Hebrides. The money saved in reduced aid obligations would be minimal in 
comparison to the disappearance of funds through tax flight. Australian Treasury ‘thought 
that the loss of revenue to the British, through tax avoidance by British residents, would be 
greater in fact than the revenue gained from operating the tax haven’.40 This was a 
perfectly reasonable observation, but it overlooked a transition that was occurring in global 
finance. The British encouragement of offshore finance had little to do with tax and almost 
everything to do with those US$60 billion in worldwide circulation at the time. For 
although those funds were globally mobile they were at home in London, with second 
homes built by their British rulers – Hong Kong, the Bahamas, Bermuda, Jersey, the 
Cayman Islands and by the early 1970s, the New Hebrides. To account for this it is 
necessary to detail events that occurred in British banks 20 years earlier. 
 
Soviet deposits, Regulation Q and the Eurodollar 
 
Between the end of World War II and the early 1970s, foreign exchange trading was 
largely determined by governments, not markets. At least that was the theory. The post war 
Bretton Woods agreement sought to regulate international finance and foreign exchange 
trading in order to prevent economic collapses such as the 1930s depression (Seabrook, 
2001). The architect of the Bretton Woods agreement John Maynard Keynes, argued that 
capital controls were necessary to preserve and protect industry and society and ‘to stop the 
                                                           
39 Correspondence Vila-Sydney, (Sydney, WHS), 22 June 1973, 2003/40/59.  
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evasion of taxes by sending money abroad’.41 However, the Bretton Woods agreement 
produced financial paradoxes and regulatory contradictions that started to be manifested in 
the mid 1950s. This was partly due to key omissions from Bretton Woods that Keynes was 
keen to include. In particular this included an independent global currency, which would 
be used for international trade.42 The US rejected this proposal. Instead the US dollar 
became the de facto international currency. It was tied to gold at US$35 per ounce and was 
used as the currency for international settlements (in other words the US dollar would be 
used to settle payments when trading goods and services between countries). 
 
This created a number of problems. The US dollar was not a neutral international currency, 
but belonged to the world’s pre-eminent super-power, making all nations, including its 
Soviet rivals, dependent on it for trade finance. Yet this dependence also constrained US 
monetary policy. The US could not easily devalue the dollar by adjusting its value to the 
price of gold, as other countries could follow suit, negating the effects of US action in this 
area (Seabrook, 2001). Moreover, the Bretton Woods agreements preserved regulatory 
diversity between states. Britain, the United States, France, Australia and other signatories 
to the agreement could set their own interest rates and determine varying levels of bank 
access to foreign exchange, creating opportunities for banks to take advantage of arbitrage 
between varying national regimes.  
 
In the mid 1950s, the geo-political implications of the dominance of the US dollar led the 
Soviet and Chinese governments (fearful of the confiscation of their US dollar holdings) to 
open US dollar accounts in European banks. Mark Hampton (1996), charts the rise of these 
dollar deposits outside the US to a decision by Chairman Mao’s government to transfer 
their US dollars from New York to the ‘Soviet-owned Banque Commerciale pour l’Europe 
du Nord in Paris, which had the cable address: Eurobank’. The Soviet Union and other 
Eastern block countries started to do the same, depositing US dollars in English banks, 
creating a new kind of financial product: the Eurodollar (Picciotto, 1999). This is not to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                
40 Memorandum, File No 735/3/1, 30 August 1972, (Canberra, NAA) A 1838/366, A 840/13/3, Part 1 New 
Hebrides as a Tax Haven. 
41 John Maynard Keynes, Speech, House of Lords, 23 May 1944, edited by Donald Moggridge, The 
Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, Activities 1941-1946, Shaping the Post-War World: Bretton 
Woods and Reparations (London 1980), 9-21. 
42 See footnote 41. 
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confused with the much more recent new European Union Euro. Rather what came to be 
known as the Eurodollar, Eurocurrency and Eurobond markets, defined foreign currency 
deposits maintained outside of their country of origin, such as US dollars kept and traded 
anywhere outside of the USA.  
 
Catherine Schenk (1998) suggests that the movement of cold war funds provided a general 
context to the emergence of the Eurodollar market. Inconsistency in policy within and 
between the US and the UK was more important as it allowed banks to exploit lacunae in 
regulatory systems. For example, in the United States Regulation Q placed ceilings on 
what banks could offer in interest on deposits until 1963. There was no such regulation in 
the UK. Thus when British Midland Bank (which Schenk credits as the first to allow 
Eurodollar deposits), started to attract US dollar deposits in 1955, they could pay much 
higher interest rates to non residents than would be available in the US itself. However, 
instead of depositing these US dollars in the Bank of England they ‘used their dollar 
deposits for loans to third parties either in the UK or abroad’ (Schenk, 1998, p. 221). This 
attracted new customers with more US dollars that flowed into the UK. With only 
cautionary reservations permitting extensive self-regulation the Bank of England and 
Treasury encouraged this as a means of maintaining London as the world’s leading 
international finance centre.  
 
The Bank of England, was not only lender of last resort, but had close relationships with 
leading members of the private banking sector in London, in the form of interlocking 
directorships, kinship ties and ‘gentlemen’s agreements’, often in-lieu of formal 
regulations (Schenk, 1998; Hampton, 1996). The UK Treasury and Bank of England, 
created a highly regulated onshore domestic economy, but by permitting the growth of the 
Eurodollar and Eurobond (loans in US dollars) markets they also facilitated the rapid rise 
of a deregulated offshore market, with the city of London at its centre, fiscally partitioned 
from the mainstream British economy. Between 1959 and 1961 Eurodollar deposits in UK 
authorised banks grew from US$190 million to US$710 million (Schenk, 1998; Hampton, 
1996). In the following decade the global Eurobond market expanded exponentially, from 
US$7 billion in 1963 to approximately US$91 billion at the end of 1972 (Picciotto, 1999). 
This generated a massive pool of deregulated private liquidity that could be traded with 
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minimal restrictions in complete anonymity. In his analysis of US power in international 
finance, Leonard Seabrooke (2001, p. 62) compared Eurodollars to ‘bills of exchange in 
previous errors’ that offered ‘wealthy investors and banks a means to send their financial 
assets out of territories where there was a threat of plunder, or in the American case, 
interest rate caps that impeded profits’. 
 
In both the UK and the US (as well other industrialised states such as Australia and France 
where regulations were even tighter), there were still reserve requirements (the amounts of 
money banks had to keep in order to cover withdraws), interest rate ceilings and 
inconsistent capital controls (for example, the UK welcomed the flow of funds into 
London, but still regulated their outward movement). In many British territories, 
particularly the smaller islands and enclaves, none of these restrictions existed. Thus they 
were ideal ‘booking centres’ for Eurodollar deposits and the raising of Eurobond loans, 
whereby these funds could be legally domiciled in tax free OFCs such as Bermuda, the 
Bahamas and the Cayman Islands, along with larger regional hubs such as Hong Kong and 
Singapore (Hampton, 1996). As Picciotto (1999) shows, in these territories Common law 
was received and OFC facilities, enabling such book entries, could be introduced by 
statute. This gave new meaning to the Bank of England’s recommendation that there 
should be ‘suitable geographical spread of deposits and maturity’ (Schenk, 1998). Indeed 
these Eurodollar deposits and transactions would be spread to the far ends of the earth. The 
manifestations of the inherent contradictions of the Bretton Woods had unleashed a wave 
of liquidity across the globe, and separated the offshore from the onshore as distinct 
domains of activity, while retaining vital links between them. It allowed bankers, fund 
managers, lawyers and trustees to by-pass, quite legally, national rules and regulations, 
with the support of two key state actors: the United States and the United Kingdom, both 
keen to reassert and maintain their pre-eminence as the world’s leading financial powers. 
Countries, such as Australia and France were committed to regulations and capital 
controls. They had relatively weak financial markets with the government exercising tight 
control over the supply of credit. They were no match for the alliance of capital and Anglo-
American state power.  
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Yet while Australian authorities may have been taken by surprise by these developments in 
international finance, its bankers, corporate lawyers and trustee officers were becoming 
aware of the potential of these new markets. In Vila tax planning and money market 
trading merged in a surge of offshore activity whereby rules and regulations could be 
legally transcended. As one Australian banker advised London in 1973, ‘For your 
information we have adequate ‘islands’ Australian dollar liquids available in Vila, Nauru 
and Tarawa branches to fund bond purchases (within a limit which would need to be 
determined).’43 A realm of islands and enclaves, awash in oceans of liquidity, had been 
created beyond the shores of state regulation. This enabled the New Hebrides, and Vila, to 
trade US dollars on the London money market, creating links and flows from the banks and 
finance houses of the city to the construction boom of a once far-away Pacific port town.  
 
A ‘Vila Book’: The New Hebrides and the London money markets 
 
In November 1971 the ANZ Banking Group announced that it has set up a subsidiary in 
the New Hebrides, called the International Finance Corporation (IFC). Other shareholders 
in the subsidiary included the ANZ, the Bank of Montreal, Crocker National Bank, Irving 
Trust Co and the Mitsubishi Bank. The company with, seven directors, two or whom were 
local, was established to trade in ‘Eurodollar, Australian dollar and Sterling currencies’.44 
From the very beginnings banks and trust firms established offices in Vila to participate in 
the highly lucrative Eurocurrency market. These globally mobile funds converged in a 
fiscal environment where it was recommended to keep as many profits on Vila’s books as 
possible for tax purposes.45 Capital mobility, tax optimisation and anonymity (bonds were 
traded as bearer instruments, that is the holder was anonymous) could intersect in offshore 
states such as the New Hebrides.  
 
 
                                                           
43 Correspondence, Sydney-London, (Sydney, WHS), 25 July 1973,WHS 2003/40/81.  
44 ‘ANZ Group subsidiary set up in New Hebrides’, Australian Financial Review, 16 November 1971, 
(Canberra, NAA) A 1838/366, A 840/13/3, Part 1 New Hebrides as a Tax Haven. 
45 Correspondence, Sydney London, (Sydney, WHS), 09 January 1973, WHS 2003/38/37. 
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The Bank of New South Wales (BNSW) allowed Eurocurrency deposits through Vila of up 
to US$2 million per day before it was required to advise its Sydney headquarters.46 In July 
1972 the BNSW in Vila participated in a US$20 million Eurobond loan to the government 
of Singapore. It contributed a four-year fixed Euro dollar loan to the bond issue. The loan 
was booked as an asset account debit and a liability account credit in Vila under the 
general ledger ‘Euro-currency loans’. 47 
 
Trading Eurobonds out of Vila enabled foreign banks to transcend onshore regulations. 
Reserve Bank of Australia regulations restricted non-resident investment in ‘loans or other 
fixed interest security’, while Bank of England regulations had a 25 percent surrender 
clause for bonds not sold within three months. In Vila however, none of these restrictions 
applied, ‘allowing greater flexibility in accepting underwriting or selling participations.’ 48 
The New Hebrides was used to write forward (future dated) foreign currency contracts, 
taking advantage of arbitrage in interest rates and foreign exchange differences between 
money markets. Time also became a resource, which could be hedged by mathematically 
verifiable statements of financial truth, which ‘Vila’ could produce by formula as 
follows:49 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
46 See footnote 45. 
47 Memorandum, (Sydney, WHS), 02 May 1973, WHS 2003/40/81.  
48 Correspondence, Sydney-London, (Sydney, WHS), 25 July 1973,WHS 2003/40/81.  
49 For the capacity of numbers, accounts and ledgers to produce truth statements of financial reality see Bill 
Maurer (2002a; 2002b). 
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Table 3: Forex formulas ex-Vila 50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vila was thus an ideal accounting centre that could purchase bonds in its own name, 
arrange Eurocurrency borrowings, sell and repay them, and write forward foreign 
exchange contracts with no interference from the metropolitan states. As one bank official 
noted ‘The availability of Eurodollar bonds is dictated solely by the market and is 
unaffected by central banking or government control’.51 It was in this transition from fixed 
to floating exchange rates that the New Hebrides tax haven was born.  
 
 
                                                           
50 Memorandum, (Sydney, WHS), 18 July 1973, WHS 2003/38/8.  
51 See footnote 50.  
Vila are approached (either direct or through ourselves) by an Overseas Bank wishing to sell US dollars 
against Australian dollars 3 months forward.  To arrive at the appropriate forward margin the steps will 
be:  
 
1) Vila borrows from London Office US 
dollars for three months at say –       10% 
 
Earning capacity on Australian $ balances.  
Rate set by Chief Accountant and Currently  
forward margin      + 6.50% 
 
 (discount)    – 3.50% 
 
2) The forward margin may then be widened  
out to accommodate an appropriate profit 
level for the bank (say 0.50% p.a.) following 
calculation into exchange rate terms will take 
place 
 
3 From 1) above 
 forward margin       3.50% 
 profit margin       0.50% 
 discount        4.00% p/a 
 equals discount       0.413 
 spot rate        1.4191 
 
Vila three months forward buying rate for US$    1.4334 
 
4) To cover their exchange risk exchange risk Vila to sell spot value US dollars against Australian 
dollars.  The shortfall in US dollars thus created will be met by borrowing a like amount (rounded to the 
nearest US$5,000) from London office for a term of three months.  The Australian dollar equivalent 
will be credited to Vila’s vostro account with Sydney office.   
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Conclusion  
 
The formation of the Pacific’s first major OFC in the New Hebrides was the result of 
regulatory, fiscal and temporal convergence. The British colonial authorities, backed by 
key players in the London money markets and British civil service took what was already 
an existing state of affairs and augmented it through legislation to provide for international 
vehicles that facilitated tax-free cross-border investment. This coincided with major 
structural transformations in global finance. In the New Hebrides the absence of income 
tax nestled in a basket of broader fiscal freedoms including the lack of foreign exchange 
controls, the complete absence of state regulation over interest rates and no capital reserve 
requirements for banks and insurers. The local British colonial administration was thus free 
to convert this environment into an active offshore platform through the scripting of law 
that had a ready global marketplace. Banks, trustee companies and investors were free to 
take advantage of Eurobonds and the ability to by-pass national rules and regulations and 
their accompanying taxes. While other OECD countries such as Australia and to a lesser 
extent France opposed the emergence of this offshore world, they were relatively 
powerless to prevent its rise given support and encouragement by the UK and the US.  
 
Thirty years onwards, public concern over the use of tax havens worldwide now occupies 
an important part of tax policy in all OECD countries, including the UK and US.52 In 
addressing these concerns it may not only be necessary to scrutinise the activities that 
occur inside the OFC jurisdictions themselves, but also the character of international 
relations that produced them in the first place. Just as tax havens can creatively turn credit 
into debt, so too can diplomacy make allies one day, competitors the next. It may therefore 
be necessary to decide whether or not a globalised world would benefit more from more 
tax competition or tax cooperation. Further inquiry into the histories and specificities of 
Offshore Finance Centres in the Pacific, Caribbean and Europe may well assist in 
addressing these broader global debates. 
 
                                                           
52 For details of public concern about tax minimisation using offshore vehicles see Gregory Rawlings (2003), 
and for perceptions of vertical inequalities in the tax system see Valerie Braithwaite (2003).  
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